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1. Introduction
Thinkers  sympathetic  to  the  autonomy  of  the  special  sciences  –  and  emergentists  in  particular  –
typically think, not only that the special sciences are not reducible to the fundamental physical
level, but also that the properties studied by the special sciences have causal powers of their own.
More physicalistically inclined philosophers forcefully attack the latter idea. Their master argument
is the so-called exclusion problem. It is based essentially on the idea that the physical world is
causally closed, i.e., that everything physical which happens must be a result of purely physical
causes.
The discussion has been most vigorous in the domain of the philosophy of mind, but the structure of
the  argument  is  entirely  general,  and  is  applicable  to  any  special  science  with  some  common
properties. Nevertheless, for concreteness, and because the issue is most familiar from that context,
I shall discuss the problem in the context of the philosophy of mind. All the same, my arguments
and conclusions, if sound, are applicable across the board.
2. The Causal Exclusion Problem
If only the identity theory of mind had worked, there would not be any problem with mental
causation. For if mental events were (type) identical with physical events, it would not be surprising
at all that mental events could cause physical events. However, the great majority of philosophers
are now convinced that such a view cannot be correct. The main reason for this is the so-called
multiple realizability argument: It seems plausible that a particular mental kind (property, state, or
event) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds (see e.g. Putnam 1967, Fodor 1968, Block
and Fodor 1972). In what follows, I shall simply assume that the possibility of multiple realizability
is a fact – regardless of the right conclusions to be drawn from this.
However, the denial of the identity theory re-opens the door to the problem of mental causation:
How can mental events, if they are not physical, have physical effects, such as behavior, as a
consequence? The problem becomes particularly acute in the form of what is often called “the
exclusion problem.”1 That is, consider the following five prima facie plausible theses:2
1  Variants of the exclusion problem have been presented, e.g., by Malcolm (1968), Peacocke (1979) and Schiffer
(1987). More recently, Kim (1989, 1992) and Papineau (1993, 2001) in particular have pressed the exclusion argument
in defence of physicalism; and as Papineau (2001) argues, something like the exclusion argument (and the assumption
of completeness of physics; see below) also drives the traditional type-identity theory of Smart (1959), Lewis (1966,
1972) and Armstrong (1968).
2  I have borrowed this elegant way of summarizing the exclusion problem from Bennett (2007).
2(1) Distinctness: Mental properties (and perhaps events) are distinct from physical properties
(or events) (i.e., the type-identity theory is false).
(2) Completeness: Every physical occurrence has a sufficient physical cause.
(3) Efficacy: Mental events sometimes cause physical events, and sometimes do so in virtue of
their mental properties.
(4) No overdetermination: The effects of mental causes are not systematically over-
determined.
(5) Exclusion: No effect has (at a particular time t) more than one sufficient cause unless it is
overdetermined.
The problem is that these claims seem to be incompatible.3 Philosophers, being what they are, have
certainly tried to wriggle out of this deadlock in all possible ways. But most often, (4) and (5) are
taken as background assumptions which are not questioned.
Physicalists typically commit themselves to (2), so, for them, the problem must be with either (1) or
(3). But the denial of (3) amounts to the conclusion that mental causation is an illusion, that is,
epiphenomenalism. This unattractive result has led many physicalists to deny (1) and to attempt to
vindicate, after all, reductionism, or the identity theory, in some form. Emergentists, unwilling to
give up (1) or (3), end up denying (2) and accepting ‘downward’ causation. Yet, (2), the causal
completeness of the physical world, is certainly intuitively appealing. Indeed, even many
philosophers less inclined towards physicalism (e.g. Chalmers 1996) see it as compelling. So
perhaps it should not be given up too quickly without an argument or analysis.
What makes the exclusion problem so difficult is this: It is not that something about the mental
makes it unsuitable to be a cause (as some other arguments questioning mental causation suggest).
Rather, the problem is in the physical. Given that every physical event already has a sufficient
physical cause, there is no room for the mental to cause anything, even if the mental were in
principle able to work as a cause of something.
One can, of course, dispute the details of the exclusion argument, and its fine points certainly
deserve more attention. The literature, however, is very wide ranging, and it is simply not possible
to review the numerous attempted solutions in the space of a paper like this. It is perhaps fair to say,
though, that there does not exist any widely accepted solution. Although many want to resist the
argument, philosophers’ opinions vary greatly on what exactly goes wrong in it (cf. Bennett 2007).
In any case, much of this literature seems to me to be beside the point. Some assume the outdated
idea that causation requires laws; others the arguably misguided conception of causation as a sort of
3  Note that the exclusion argument, if sound, generalizes: it threatens to make all properties studied by special sciences
(e.g. properties of biology) which are purportedly distinct from (i.e., not type-identical with) underlying physical
properties causally inefficacious. Hence, there is much more at stake here than just the mental.
3production, involving contact and transmitting something; and still others take too much for granted
the classical Lewisian counterfactual theory of causation which also faces serious problems. Some
differentiate causation and explanation, and propose that though there is no genuine causation at the
level  of  the  mental  (or,  in  general,  at  the  level  of  the  special  sciences),  explanations  in  terms  of
mental states or events (or whatever) may nevertheless be useful. I, for one, find such “solutions”
unattractive. Would it not be preferable to have an account in which (causal) explanations explain
by citing genuine causes? Still others rely on rather specific assumptions about the metaphysics of
properties or events. Though I think such approaches are not without interest, it would certainly be
better to have a way out which is independent of such detailed metaphysical views.
Consequently, I strongly feel that one needs a new start here. Accordingly, instead of doing more
armchair  metaphysics,  I  will  attempt  to  shed  some new light  on  the  problem of  mental  causation
(and more generally, on causation in the special sciences) by taking into account certain advances in
recent theorizing on causation in the philosophy of science. The theory of causation I rely on has
been developed independently of the whole debate on mental causation and the exclusion problem.
Moreover, it has considerable intrinsic plausibility. Hence, it should be interesting in the present
context to see if it can provide any clarification.
3. Causation and Fundamental Physics
Before going to the theory of causation in question, however, I want to make a brief digression to
causation at the fundamental physical level. For, the exclusion argument apparently generalizes (see
fn 2) and entails, from the physicalistic perspective, that there is genuine causation only at the
fundamental micro-physical level. It would be important to note, though, that this is emphatically
not how numerous distinguished philosophers of physics and experts in the theory of causation
view the issue. Namely, quite independently of any considerations of mental causation, the
exclusion problem, or of the idea of downward causation, the whole idea of causation becomes
problematic at the level of fundamental physics.
To begin with, it is a historical fact that the notion of cause has disappeared from physics as the
subject has developed (see Kuhn 1971; cf. Loewer 2001). More importantly, many philosophers
who apparently know their physics have argued that the whole idea of causation is not even
applicable to fundamental physics, or is incompatible with it. Very briefly, and roughly, one of the
problems is that in some cases, one has to specify the entire state of the whole universe at one time
in order to determine the state of even a small region at some later time. And in such a case, it is
difficult indeed to consider anything as a cause (Latham 1987, Redhead 1990, Field 2003, cf.
Loewer 2001, Hitchcock 2007, Elga 2007; this idea goes back, of course, to Russell 1912-13).
More specifically, from the point of view of the interventionist approach to causation (to which we
shall later turn in this paper), one may doubt the meaningfulness of the notion of cause in the
context of fundamental physics. Judea Pearl, a key developer of the interventionist theory, writes:
“If you wish to include the whole universe in the model, causality disappears because interventions
disappear – the manipulator and manipulated lose their distinction” (Pearl 2000, p. 350; see also
Hitchcock 2007). James Woodward, another important figure in the interventionist approach, is
(characteristically to him) more cautious, but still says that “causal ascription becomes less natural
4and straightforward – increasingly strained – when candidate causes expand to include the state of
the entire universe” (Woodward 2007, 93).
Some may be prepared to follow Russell and abandon the whole notion of causation as an outdated
folk notion which has no place in advanced science. However, as Nancy Cartwright (1979) has
argued, totally abandoning the concept of causation would cripple science (cf. Field 2003;
Hitchcock 2007): she does not have in mind fundamental physics, but more ordinary science, such
as  the  search  for  the  causes  of  cancer.  The  notion  of  cause  is  intimately  connected  with  the
distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. For example, if smoking causes lung cancer,
then stopping smoking is an effective strategy for avoiding cancer. Consequently, most
philosophers who are skeptical about causation at the fundamental physical level have still
concluded that causation has a firm place at least in the special sciences.
Now,  in  what  follows,  I  do  not  want  to  commit  myself  to  the  view  that  there  is  no  causation  in
fundamental physics – I do not even want to pretend that I am competent to judge the issue.
However, it is important to keep in mind that many able philosophers have concluded this. But be
that as it may, it just is not the case – contrary to what numerous physicalistic metaphysicians take
for granted – that causation is uncontroversially present in fundamental physics. Therefore, such
philosophers should perhaps think twice before declaring, from the armchair, that there is causation
only at the fundamental physical level.
4. The Interventionist Theory of Causation
Recently, a ‘manipulationist’ or ‘interventionist’ theory of causation has emerged in the philosophy
of science. It has been developed especially by James Woodward (1997, 2000, 2003), although
related ideas have been put forward, e.g., by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines
(2000).4 This theory can be viewed as a variant of the counterfactual theories of causation, but it is
particularly attractive in its avoidance of many well-known problems of the more traditional
counterfactual theories. The theory can also be seen as a sophisticated version of the general idea of
causes as difference-makers.5 Furthermore, the interventionist theory also embodies the idea that
causal claims are essentially contrastive (see below).
One way of motivating this approach is to ask the questions: What is the point of our having a
notion of causation (in contrast to, say, a mere notion of correlation) at all? What role or function
does this concept play in our lives? Why do we care to distinguish between causal and merely
correlational relationships? (cf. Woodward 2003, p. 28) According the interventionist approach, the
answer is that such knowledge of genuine causal relationships is, sometimes, practical and
applicable: by manipulating the cause we can influence the effect. If there is a real causal
relationship between A and B, manipulating A is  a way to change B; Mere correlation between C
4  Manipulationist theories of causation, in fact, have a longer history. Earlier variants include Collingwood 1940,
Gasking 1955, von Wright 1971, and Menzies and Price 1993. These tend to be, however, problematically
anthropocentric, subjectivistic and reductionistic, and are moreover threatened with circularities. The more recent
interventionist variants apparently avoid such problems; cf. Woodward 2001.
5  For the idea of causes as difference-makers, see Menzies 2007; cf. Menzies 2008; List and Menzies 2009.
5and D, on the other hand, just disappears if one attempts to affect D by manipulating C. (Obviously,
our knowledge of causal relationships and our interest in them need not be restricted only to
applicable causal relations; it can certainly be purely theoretical and based on curiosity. Not all
science is applied science.) Thus, we can try to find a cure for AIDS, suppress poverty or prevent
eutrophication of the Baltic Sea on the basis of knowledge about the causal relationships associated
with them.
Real causal relationships can, in favorable circumstances, be distinguished from accidental
correlations experimentally, by manipulating the initial conditions (the putative causes) and
investigating whether this has consequences on the effects (surely, this is often in practice
impossible). The interventionist theory of causation thus emphasizes the close connection between
causal thinking and experimental research (and manipulation and control).
The interventionist theory of causation has been developed into a sophisticated theory, but its basic
idea can be explained quite simply. It connects causal claims with counterfactual claims concerning
what would happen to an effect under interventions on its putative cause. Roughly, C causes E if
and only if an intervention on C would bring about a change in E. Slightly more exactly, causal
claims relate, in this approach, variables, say X and Y, that can take at least two values. These may
often be some magnitudes (such as temperature, electric charge or pressure), but in simple cases,
they may also be just discrete alternative events or states of affairs. The idea now is that were there
an intervention on the value of X, this would also result a change in the value of Y.
Heuristically, one may think of interventions as manipulations that might be carried out by a human
agent in an idealized experiment. Nevertheless, the approach is in no way anthropocentric, and
intervention can be defined in purely causal terms (that a causal vocabulary is presupposed means
that the theory does not aim to give a reductive analysis of causation. This does not make the
approach viciously circular: “X causes Y” is explicated with the help of other causal relations and
correlational information.)
In order to distinguish genuine causation from other ways in which an intervention I that changes X
might be associated with changes in Y, some further conditions must be added. Roughly, it is
required that I does not cause Y directly via a route that does not go through X, that I not be
correlated with other causes of Y besides those causes that lie on the causal route (if any) from I to X
to Y, and so on.6
As was already noted, this approach is a version of the counterfactual theories of causation.
According to the interventionist account, whether a relation is causal can be evaluated with the help
of counterfactuals which have to do with the outcomes of hypothetical interventions. Such
counterfactuals are called “active counterfactuals.” These are such that their antecedents are made
true by an intervention. Active counterfactuals have the form:
If X were to be changed by an intervention to such and such a value,
the value of Y would change.
6  For an exact definition, see Woodward 2000, 2003.
6It has become increasingly popular to think that causal claims do not in fact describe a simple
binary relation between two events, but rather involve (even if often only implicitly) a contrastive
class for both cause and effect, that is, they contrast alternatives to the putative cause and effect (see
e.g. Hitchcock 1996; Menzies 2008), The interventionist approach to causality, which relates
variables, also incorporates this idea: variables can take different values; different choices of
possible alternative values lead to different contrast classes. In its context, some contrasts need to be
fixed; otherwise, causal claims are not even unambiguous. If, for example, X could take as its value
either x1 or x2, and Y either y1 or y2, the relevant causal claim, with the contrasts made explicit,
could be:
X’s being x1 (rather than x2) causes Y’s being y1 (rather than y2).
Note that different choices of contrasts, say, x3 and y3, for the same x1 and y1, for example, lead to
different  causal  claims,  some  of  which  may  be  false,  some  true.  The  most  natural,  “default”
contrast, though, is – unless there is some specific reason to choose differently – that the presence
rather than absence of the property (or whatever) at issue is caused by the presence of the another
appropriate property (or whatever) rather than absence of it (see Woodward 2003, p. 67-8, 145-6;
cf. Woodward 2008, p. 235-236; see also Menzies 2008).7 In this standard case, the relevant active
counterfactual would have the form:
(1) If X’s being x1 were to be changed by an intervention to X’s not being x1,
then Y would change from being y1 to not being y1.
But it should be kept in mind that there may be special grounds to choose the contrast differently.
Now, this is not the right place to try to defend the interventionist theory of causation.8 Suffice it to
say that it is in various ways a promising and intuitively attractive theory, and seems to be
successfully gaining ground in the philosophy of science, and the theory of causation in general.
What I want to do in this paper is only to consider mental causation and the exclusion problem from
the perspective of this theory of causation.
The first thing to note is that mental states or events are perfectly legitimate candidates for the role
of causes in the proposed account. It is indeed commonplace to affect peoples’ behaviour by
manipulating their beliefs and/or desires. For example, Nazi propaganda was able to bring about
violence towards Jews in die Kristallnacht by making people believe that there was a Jewish
conspiracy behind the murder of a certain German diplomat. Less dramatic examples can easily be
found in marketing and advertising, and the psychological research supporting them.
7 For more about default contrasts, see also Hitchcock 2007 and Menzies 2009.
8  Woodward 2003 is a book-length defense of this approach; see also Woodward 2004.
7Two characteristics of the interventionist approach deserve special attention in the present context.
First, it is nowhere required that a cause must be individuated with physicalistic concepts. All that is
required is that it would make sense to manipulate it (although, it is obviously not required that it is
in all cases humanly possible to manipulate it in practice). Second, no laws are required to subsume
the cause and the effect in order for there to be causation. Among other things, this undermines a
key premise of Davidson’s anomalous monism. Nevertheless, these observations do not, as such,
answer the worry about the exclusion problem. However, I aim to show that the interventionist
theory of causation can in fact be helpful in our attempts to answer it.
5. The Argument
Now there is an argument, discovered independently (at least) by the present author and Peter
Menzies (see Raatikainen 2006, 2007; Menzies 2008),9 which shows that from the interventionist
perspective, a mental state can truly be a cause of, e.g., behavior; and more drastically, that – at
least in some ways of conceptualizing the situation10 – the underlying physical state may fail to be
the cause.
I prefer to present the argument with the help of a concrete (and perhaps even a bit oversimplifying)
example:  Thus,  assume  that,  at  the  moment,  John  desperately  wants  a  beer.  This  is  part  of  our
constant background, which does not vary. Suppose, then, that he forms a firm belief (say, he
suddenly remembers that he has earlier bought a six pack of beer and put it in the refrigerator) that
there is some beer in the refrigerator. Consequently, he walks to the refrigerator to get a beer.
Suppose that this is what actually happens (i.e., this is stipulated to be our actual world below). Can
John’s belief now be taken as the cause of his behavior? Or is it rather John’s brain state (or brain
event; or whatever underlying physical state), call it B, at the moment?
Let us imagine, counterfactually, the following intervention I: Peter, John’s roommate, walks into
the  room  and  informs  John  that  he  has  drunk  all  John’s  beers  in  the  refrigerator  (even  if  Peter’s
actions were not fair, John has no reason to doubt that Peter is telling the truth). John then gives up
the belief that there are beers in the refrigerator. Accordingly, John, instead of going to the
refrigerator, leaves for the closest grocery to buy more beer.
John either has the belief that there is some beer in the refrigerator (X = x1), or he does not have it
(X = x2). In the former case, he goes to the refrigerator (Y = y1), in the latter case he goes to the
grocery (Y = y2). Let us suppose, for simplicity, that these cases exhaust all possible cases. It looks
as if Peter’s hypothetical interference satisfies all the conditions of a proper intervention (see also
below).
9  Also Carl Craver (2007, pp. 223-4) briefly sketches what seems to amount to the same argument, giving credit to Eric
Marcus (unpublished). Thus, such an argument seems to be very much in the air. [While this paper was under review,
Woodward 2008 also came out; Woodward himself is developing there many ideas that are quite similar to those
expressed in this paper. I have added a couple of references to Woodward’s paper in order to help comparison.]
10 That is, with certain natural ways of choosing the contrasts.
8There are in fact two significantly different kinds of causal claims that can be considered from the
interventionist perspective, claims about the causal relevance11 of a variable X to another variable Y,
and claims about a variable’s particular value’s (e.g. X = x1) being a cause of a particular value of
another variable (e.g. Y = y1), given the contrasts.12 Let us first reflect on the former.
For a variable X to be causally relevant for another variable Y, it is sufficient, according to the
interventionist account, that some changes, produced by some intervention, in X lead to a change in
Y. It should be noted just how weak a requirement this really is (though, not trivial: mere
correlations fail to satisfy it). Now it can be seen quite easily (see also below) that the above
variable X (about John either having the belief or not) is causally relevant for Y: an intervention, e.g.
Peter’s hypothetical interference, which changes the value of X, brings about a change in the value
of Y.
But how about the brain state B? This depends vitally on how we set the contrasts and choose the
relevant variables. We may well let the variable Z (for the alleged cause) to range over a number of
different possible, mutually exclusive brain states of John, including B above  (i.e.  the  brain  state
which actually realizes John’s belief that there is some beer in the refrigerator); let Z = z1 just in the
case when John is in the brain state B. In that case, the variable Z is also causally relevant for Y: at
least some changes in Z lead to a change in Y too.13 However, this is still a rather modest
conclusion, and should by no means be thought as suggesting that X and Z are  somehow  in
competition here, in the spirit of the exclusion argument. The situations where several variables are
causally relevant in this sense to an effect variable are very common (in any case, they could not
possibly be competing in this sense; see Section 7). This is just a consequence of the fact that very
little is required for such a causal relevance between variables, and the conclusion is not particularly
exciting. As Woodward himself puts it, the bare claim that X is causally relevant for Y is “not very
informative”; “what one would really want to know”, he continues, “is not just whether there is
some manipulation of (intervention on) X that will change Y. One would also like to have more
detailed information about just which interventions on X will change Y” (Woodward 2003, p. 66).
If, on the other hand, we prefer instead to follow Woodward and focus on the natural or default
contrast, the alternative values of Z would be just  “John has the brain state B” (Z = z1) and “John
does not have the brain state B” (Z = z2). In this case, things become much more interesting, as we
will  soon see.  In order to evaluate whether we should consider John’s belief or his brain state (or
11 In the interventionist literature, if the variable X is causally relevant for the variable Y, it is often said that X causes Y.
This manner of speaking admittedly deviates from the normal usage. In what follows, I only talk about “causal
relevance” in such cases, just in order to keep these two kinds of causal claims clearly distinguished. But this is purely
verbal choice from my part – nothing really hinges on this choice.
12  It is sometimes suggested that these correspond one-one to the so-called type-causation and token-causation, familiar
from the philosophical literature on causation. However, I do not think that the issue is this simple. In particular, I think
that both these sorts of claims can be meaningfully made at least in the type level (cf. Menzies 2008).
13 Consequently, if we were to follow the somewhat deviant interventionist manner of speaking (cf. fn 11), we could say
both that X causes Y and that Z causes Y.
9both?) as the cause of his behavior (going to the refrigerator) in this sense, let us consider the
following two active counterfactuals:
(1) If John’s belief that there is beer in the refrigerator were to be changed by an
intervention to not having the belief, he would have gone to the grocery (and not to the
refrigerator).
(2) If John’s brain state B were to be changed by an intervention to not having that state, he
would have gone to the grocery (and not to the refrigerator).
Now according to the standard possible-world analysis of counterfactual conditionals,
‘P? Q’ is true if and only if either there is no P-world, or some P & Q-world is more similar to the
actual world than any P &  not-Q-world. The analysis makes ‘P?? Q’  trivially  true  when P is
impossible, which is when there is no P-world.14
Obviously it would have been possible that John had neither the belief nor the brain state B; hence,
we  must  focus  on  the  second  case.  It  is  quite  clear  that  (1)  emerges  as  true;  only  by  postulating
some further differences from the actual world can we make the antecedent true but the consequent
false. Hence, John’s belief is indeed causally relevant for his behavior.
But what about (2)? Given that we have granted the possibility of multiple realizability, it should be
possible for there to be another brain state B´,  one that is  different from B, which can also realize
the belief that there is some beer in the refrigerator. Hence, there is a possible world w in which an
intervention changes John’s brain state from B to B´, and John nevertheless goes to the refrigerator
and not to the grocery. So this is a P & not-Q-world. Moreover, w seems to be, by all standards,
much more similar to the actual world than the one where John does not believe that there is some
beer in the refrigerator and consequently goes, instead of the refrigerator, to the grocery. Hence, (2)
apparently comes out as false.15 And consequently, if we hang onto the default contrast, the variable
Z (whether John’s has B or not) is not even causally relevant for the variable Y (whether John goes
to the refrigerator, or to the grocery).
Let  us  next  look  at  causal  claims  about  particular  values  of  variables,  and  first,  with  respect  to
John’s belief. Now the causal claim “John’s having the belief (that there is beer in the refrigerator)
caused him to go to refrigerator”, in symbols, “X = x1 causes Y = y1”, is true if and only if, first, it is
actually the case that X = x1 and Y = y1, and second, if an intervention were to change the value of X
14  Woodward has certain reservations about the standard Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals. But in the present
example, its possible problems appear to be irrelevant. The relative similarity between worlds seems to be sufficiently
clear in these cases, and no violation of the laws of nature, or “miracles”, are involved.  Neither is Lewis’s ultra-realism
about possible worlds assumed.
     In the interventionist literature, counterfactuals are evaluated instead by systems of equations.  In the present simple
case, this approach gives apparently the same results. I have leaned here on the possible world approach because it is
more familiar.
15 In my own case, this argument was inspired by Tim Crane’s quite similar argument with respect to a more traditional
counterfactual approach to causation (Crane 2001, 64-65), though others seem to have been able to arrive at the idea
independently of it.
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from x1 to x2, the value of Y would change from y1 to y2 (which amounts to our active counterfactual
(1) above). It follows immediately from the above considerations that this causal claim is true.
The case of brain states (or whatever underlying physical properties) is also straightforward here.
We have stipulated that the actual values of Z and Y are z1 and y1, respectively. However, if we
again focus on the default contrast, the relevant second condition is simply our above counterfactual
(2), and comes out as false. It would be therefore wrong to say that Z = z1 causes Y = y1. In other
words, the causal claim, with contrasts made explicit,
John’s having the brain state B (rather than not having it) caused his going
to the refrigerator (rather than to the grocery),
is false. Thus, according to this analysis, the brain state B is  not,  contrary  to  all  appearances,  the
cause of John’s behavior (his going to the refrigerator), but John’s belief is. Consequently, mental
states (or events) can be genuine causes, i.e., there is, in a sense, downward causation. Of course,
the occurrence of B is surely sufficient for the effect, John’s behavior, but that does not make it the
cause of  the  latter.  Being  sufficient  condition  for  the  occurrence  of  something,  and  being  its
difference-making cause, must thus be clearly distinguished.
6. Some Elaboration of the Argument
The above argument certainly deserves, and requires, further elaboration. To begin with, in the
interventionist approach, one can distinguish between various different notions of cause. First, one
can contrast the notion of a contributing cause with the notion of a total cause. And, second, there
is the notion of a direct cause, in contrast to the notion of a non-direct cause. The notion of a total
cause allows a rather simple interventionist definition,16 but the notions of a contributing cause and
of a direct cause involve certain difficulties, and require more sophisticated definitions.
Nonetheless,  the  notion  of  a  contributing  cause  is  needed  primarily  in  the  cases  of  cancellation.17
And whatever are the complications with mental causation, there does not generally seem to occur
such cancellations. Moreover, whether some cause is direct or not depends heavily on our way of
conceptualizing the situation – on which factors we decide to consider explicitly as variables.
Consequently, one need not perhaps worry too much about such fine distinctions here, and one may
focus on the general idea of the interventionist approach.
Of course, one must also make sure that the alleged intervention I is indeed a genuine intervention.
To begin with, could an intervention I,  in  our  simple  example  (for  example,  Peter’s  hypothetical
interference), cause Y directly without going through X? It does not seem so: if an intervention
(such as Peter’s utterance) failed to change X, John’s belief, John would have still gone to the
16  (TC) X is  a total cause of Y if  and  only  if  there  is  a  possible  intervention  on X which will change Y (or  the
probability distribution of Y); see Woodward 2003, p. 45, 51.
17  As, for example, in Heslow’s (1976) classical example, in which birth control pills both directly cause an increased
probability of thrombosis, but also lower the probability of pregnancy, which is itself a positive probabilistic cause of
thrombosis.
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refrigerator (i.e., no change in Y). Or could I be  correlated  with  other  causes  of Y besides those
causes that lie on the causal route (if any) from I to X to Y? Again, if I did not change X, John’s
belief, there does not seem to be any other route through which it could influence Y.
Could there be a common cause for X and Y such that X and Y are not causally related? In that case,
it should be possible to vary the value of X by an intervention without a change in Y (while
everything else remains unchanged). Once more, this is apparently impossible. If John’s belief is
changed, his behavior changes too (other things being equal). And quite clearly, in the counter-
factual scenario, Peter’s report is a cause of the change of John’s belief. In sum, Peter’s interference
can indeed be taken as a true intervention.
7. The Question of Overdetermination
It is a plausible and widely accepted thesis that everything that exists supervenes on the
fundamental physical level, i.e., that the physical facts determine all possible higher-level facts,
with metaphysical necessity. At least, it seems that any physicalist must assume so.
Now the philosopher’s standard examples of apparently rare cases of overdetermination are such as
a death caused by several members of a firing squad shooting simultaneously. As has been noted by
some philosophers even independently of the interventionist approach, the relation between a
mental state and its underlying physical state is much more intimate than between e.g. the
individual shooters of the squad (see e.g. Loewer 2001, Funkhauser 2001).
From the interventionist perspective, however, somewhat surprising consequences follow for the
whole overdetermination issue. That is, even raising the question whether a mental state and the
physical state realizing it overdetermine the effect or not, requires that we consider a causal system
which  includes  a  variable  for  both.  However,  this  is  turn  commands  that  one  can,  at  least  in
principle, vary their values independently of each other (like one could, by a hypothetical
intervention, prevent one shooter firing his gun without affecting the others, in the above firing
squad case). But in as much as it is necessary that the facts of the physical level determine the
mental level (supervenience), this is simply impossible, and consequently, the question of
overdetermination does not even make sense in this context. And if this is so, a key premise of the
exclusion argument, (4), seems to fail to make sense.18 This gives us, from the interventionist point
of view, another independed reason for doubting the whole exclusion argument.
8. Completeness and Exclusion Revisited
Consider now again the two other premises of the exclusion argument, namely, Completeness and
Exclusion:
(2) Completeness: Every physical occurrence has a sufficient physical cause.
18 Woodward now seems to have ended up with a similar conclusion (see Woodward 2008, Section 6).
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(5) Exclusion: No effect has more than one sufficient cause unless it is overdetermined.
Note now that from the point of view of our preferred view of causation here, both these
assumptions involve confusing causes with sufficient conditions. There are causes, which are
difference-makers;  and  there  are  sufficient  conditions,  which  are  wholly  different  issues  and  not
causes of any sort; there are no such things as sufficient causes. Hence, I do not think that these two
assumptions are so much false (or true) as mongrels based on a conceptual confusion which fail to
make clear sense. After all, the whole point of the exclusion argument and the debate surrounding it
is to ask whether the mental is capable of being a cause of something physical. But then, surely the
argument and its premises should talk about causes and not be formulated in terms of sufficient
conditions.
For somewhat similar reasons, List and Menzies (2009) propose that we would revise Exclusion (as
they have formulated it)19 and see what happens:
Revised Exclusion: For all distinct properties M and B such that M supervenes on B, M and B
are not both difference-making causes of a property A.
List and Menzies then demonstrate – interestingly and quite surprisingly – that this revised
exclusion principle is not in general true.
But what if we also revise (2) and write it in terms of difference-making causes:
(2´) Revised Completeness: Every physical occurrence has a physical difference-making
cause.
Once again, the right conclusion depends on the contrasts chosen. However, if we keep on
concentrating on the default contrasts – and it is unclear what other contrasts could even be meant
in a statement as general as this – our key argument above provides a counter-example for this
Revised Completeness. That is, however intuitively appealing, Completeness (or “the causal closure
of the physical”), when cleaned from confusions, turns out after all to be false.20
9. Conclusion
Mental states or events – and more generally, any properties etc. studied by the special sciences
which are multiply realizable, and thus can not be identified with properties of the lower physical
level – can be as causally relevant as anything can, and be genuine causes of physical events. Does
this vindicate the emergentist claim that a higher-level property may have causal powers of its own?
19  Their formulation of Exclusion as well as of the whole exclusion argument is a bit different from mine. I have not
attempted here to formulate their result in my setting, or to make our terminologies commensurable. I merely want to
mention their work as it is clearly related to my considerations about Revised Completeness, and indeed inspired my
way of presenting the issue here.
20 As it happens, Menzies (2008) draws the same conclusion.
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This depends a lot on how one understands “causal power” and what exactly one means by “having
causal  powers  of  its  own”.  And I,  for  one,  find  it  rather  unclear  as  to  what,  more  precisely,  such
slogans mean. If it means merely that something is causally relevant, and can be concluded to be a
cause, the answer is, in the light of the above arguments, affirmative. If, on the other hand,
something stronger and more metaphysical is demanded, it is not at all clear that the claim can be
supported. But in any case, perhaps even the former, more modest conclusion is reassuring enough.
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